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Are Payday Loans Really Evil?
Controversy, Regulation, and Innovation
in the Secondary Financial Services Market
David Stoesz
University of Illinois–Springfield
Department of Social Work
Stagnant income and persistent debt have induced low- and
middle-income households to rely on alternative financial services (AFS): buy-here-pay-here auto loans, check-cashers, payday
loans, auto title loans, rent-to-own furniture and appliances, and
pawnshops. A secondary financial services market has evolved to
serve the secondary labor market, replete with trade associations
as well as state and federal regulators. Mainstream financial institutions have marketed innovations, such as reloadable debit
cards, to appeal to low- and middle-income consumers. High fees
and interest rates of AFS products have fueled a volatile debate
about the future of the secondary financial services market,
with options including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.
Key words: debt, alternative financial services, AFS, secondary
financial services, secondary labor market

The Secondary Financial Services Market complements the
economic circumstances of workers in the Secondary Labor
Market, whose chronically low-income, limited upward mobility, and susceptibility to expense shocks cause them to resort
to Alternative Financial Services (AFS). As AFS product innovation has proceeded apace, an ensuing controversy about
the relationship between poverty and AFS has led to reactive
reform strategies, including prohibition, regulation, and inclusion. Proactive reforms that would provide constructive financial products to low-income households include Communitybased financial services through community credit unions and
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the post office. Schools of social work have only recently begun
to include financial services training in their curricula.
The expansion of Alternative Financial Services (AFS)
reflects the consolidation of a Secondary Financial Services
Market that serves workers in the secondary labor market. In
the U.S., economic dualism has been examined extensively
through analysis of the labor market. Michael Piore proposed
a theory of dual labor markets in 1970, contrasting a primary
labor market consisting of jobs that were salaried, paid well,
included benefits, and were part of a career trajectory as
opposed to a secondary labor market composed of hourly pay
at low wages, with few, if any, benefits, which offered no career
advancement and were often temporary or seasonal. Jobs in
the secondary labor market, often high-turnover, include “the
hourly staff of security-guard services and janitorial services
and the floor staff of fast-food restaurants and some types
of stores, such as supermarkets and low-priced department
stores” (Bewley, 1995, p. 233). Wholesale, retail, and service
sector firms typically justify low wages because of staff turnover, absenteeism, insubordination, as well as petty theft and
pilferage. Because of the flat wage profile of employees in
the secondary labor market, workers tend to move laterally
from job to job as opposed to upwardly into the primary labor
market (Wachter, 1974).
The psychological implications of the secondary labor
market are profound with respect to upward mobility: “secondary jobs do not require and often discourage stable working
habits, wages are low, turnover is high, and job ladders are
few. Secondary jobs are mainly (though not exclusively) filled
by minority workers, women, and youth” (Reich, Gordon &
Edwards, 1973, pps. 359-360). Structural features of the secondary labor market impede ascent into the primary labor
market, and:
dual labor theory focuses attention on structure that
endures irrespective of changes in human capital or
with effort. It also focuses on missing rungs on career
ladders, gaps that prevent upward mobility and sticky
jobs that hold some workers to lives spent toiling in
unrewarding, insecure, low-wage jobs. (Hudson, 2008)
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The stratification of financial markets has become part of
the nation’s economic structure (Olen, 2012), as described by
Mayer (2010):
Affluent households were served by the commercial
and industrial banks. These institutions made loans in
large sums at low rates of interest but only to salaried
professionals with good credit and reliable co-signers.
The credit unions served working people but were tied
to places of business, usually the larger employers.
While their rates were low, they asked a lot of questions
about what the money was for and supervised
borrowers more closely. They served the better risks
in the middle strata of the workforce. Pawnshops, by
contrast, dealt with a clientele that lived in straitened
circumstances and could only get cash by mortgaging
a piece of personal property at a big discount. (p. 84)
In response to the economic circumstances and needs of
lower-income households, AFS thrived, evolving to become
part of the cultural infrastructure of low-income communities.
The relationship between financial services markets and labor
markets is depicted in Table 1.
Table 1. Dual Labor Markets and Financial Services
Labor Market

Occupations

Financial Services

Professionals, managers,
unionized workers,
business owners

Savings and checking accounts,
retirement portfolios, mortgages
and auto loans, tax and investment
consultants

Low-wage service
workers, transient agricultural workers, day
and seasonal laborers,
contingent workers

Check-cashing, money orders, buyhere-pay-here auto sales, payday
loans, rent-to-own, pawn

Primary
Salaried with
career track
and benefits
Secondary
Hourly wages
without career
track or
benefits

The American economy could provide a continuum of
financial services, of course, products serving the range of
economic groups while responding to their discrete preferences; however, the bifurcation of financial markets is evidence that structural factors, practices of mainstream financial
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institutions, and the preferences of consumers contribute to
the evolution of the Secondary Financial Services Market.
Structural factors include dualism in the labor market, regional
economic disparities, and cyclical downturns. In addition, immigrants competing for low-skilled jobs, declining union membership, and automation pushed wages lower (Appelbaum,
Berhardt & Murname, 2003). Practices of mainstream financial institutions, primarily banks and credit unions, have effectively excluded lower-income households; for their part,
the unbanked and underbanked have responded to minimal
balance requirements, high fees for managing accounts, penalties for overdrafts, rigorous loan underwriting, and inaccessibility with respect to location, inconvenient hours of service,
and lack of receptivity of staff by defecting from mainstream
financial institutions to AFS.

Windfalls
Economically speaking, workers in the secondary labor
market face constant impediments, their plight poignantly
portrayed in Nickel and Dimed by Barbara Ehrenreich (2001)
and The Working Poor by David Shipler (2004). Michael Weiss
has disaggregated the secondary labor market according to
consumption patterns, income, and location, describing such
marketing clusters as “rural industria” (low-income blue collar
families), “blue highways” (moderate/blue collar farm families), “back-country folks” (remote rural villages), and “hard
scrabble” (older families in poor, isolated areas). Consumption
patterns, such as preferences for country music, Mountain
Dew, and pick-up trucks, complement regional labor markets
where jobs at low-wage retailers, including Wal-Mart and
McDonalds, predominate, evidence of reciprocity between
commerce and labor (Weiss, 2000, p. 13).
In their efforts to reconcile low-wages with consumption
demands, workers in such circumstances often make improvident decisions, maxing-out credit cards and incurring
overdrafts. Olen (2012) coined the term “money scripts” to
define the mind-set of consumers whose credit reach exceeds
their economic grasp (p. 20). So, as Pew researchers found, of
payday borrowers who had used a credit card, 59 percent had
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maxed-out their limits, and 52 percent had over-drafted their
checking accounts during the previous year, a problem that
was exacerbated when payday lenders caused overdrafts for
27 percent of borrowers who bounced a check for repayment
on a loan. Given the financial straits of many lower income
families, the default payment option mandated by state law
becomes important for payday borrowers:
When the default was a two-week repayment, the case
in Washington state, 90 percent of borrowers failed to
opt for an available, extended repayment plan, while
the automatic default of a 180-day installment loan
was the choice by 86 percent of borrowers in Colorado.
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013, pp. 31-37)
Payday borrowers viewed loans not as a regular bill, even
when they frequently resorted to such loans, but as a quick
infusion of cash. Accordingly, many payday borrowers used
windfalls, especially tax refunds, to close outstanding loans.
One in six, or 17 percent, of payday borrowers used a tax
refund to pay off a loan. “The large windfall provided by a tax
refund enables borrowers to repay a loan principal that their
regular paychecks are not sufficient to cover” (Pew Charitable
Trusts, 2012, p. 27). In the boom-and-bust personal finances of
workers of the secondary labor market, such a strategy may be
considered rational.

Controversy
Political battles have erupted over AFS, lending an air of
siege over the Secondary Financial Services Market. Biblical
injunctions against usury have animated opponents of payday
lending, especially in the “Bible belt.” After prohibiting
payday lending in 2001, the North Carolina legislature is considering permitting such loans once again (Woolverton, 2013).
Other jurisdictions have instituted interest rate caps that effectively prohibit payday loans; in 2008, Ohio limited interest
to 28 percent, while the District of Columbia put in place a 24
percent interest rate cap in 2007. In its most recent survey of
state regulations, the National Conference of State Legislatures
reported that thirty-eight states permitted payday lending to
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varying degrees (Morton, 2013).
The Center for Responsible Lending (CRL) has served as a
source of information for opponents of financial products and
practices that it considers exploitive of low-income, disproportionately minority populations. Created in 2002 as a nonprofit,
CRL has been supported by prominent foundations and has
issued several reports focusing on “predatory lending.” In its
advocacy, CRL analysts have argued that a majority of borrowers are victims of predatory lenders. In 2012, CRL received
a MacArthur Foundation “Creative & Effective Institutions”
award.
CRL has worked in tandem with the Consumer Federation
of America (CFA), which was established as a nonprofit in the
mid-1960s to represent consumers’ rights. Representing 300
advocacy organizations nationwide, CFA addresses a range of
financial services, including payday and auto-title loans, focusing on abusive practices: “Cash-strapped consumers run the
risk of becoming trapped in repeat borrowing due to triple-digit interest rates, unaffordable repayment terms, and coercive collection
tactics made possible by check-holding” (Consumer Federation
of America, 2013, p. 1, emphasis in original). For networking
purposes, CFA maintains a listserv for advocates of regulating what it considers abusive lending practices. CFA was an
advocate for the Military Lending Act (MLA) of 2007, which
instituted a 36 percent limit on interest rates charged on loans
to members of the military and dependents.
Short of prohibition, opponents of AFS have advocated a
36 percent interest rate limit on loans, which equates to prohibition, since lenders insist that interest rate is too low for their
business model. A penultimate strategy of AFS opponents
has been strict regulation. Thus, limiting fees and interest, restricting the number of loans annually, outlawing consecutive
roll-over loans, and requiring “cooling-off” periods between
loans are methods that have been advocated by opponents of
payday loans to make them less harmful to consumers (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2012, p. 20).
The controversy over AFS centers around habitual use,
with opponents conceptualizing a “debt trap” when consumers resort to products repeatedly, incurring charges that exacerbate their already fragile finances. For example, CRL has
argued that five or more payday loans per year constitute a
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“debt trap” from which consumers have difficulty escaping.
Evidence and logic dispute the debt trap concept, however.
Using Oklahoma payday data, CRL analysts calculated that
”90 percent of business is generated by borrowers with five or
more loans per year, and over 60 percent of business is generated by borrowers with 12 or more loans per year” (King &
Parrish, 2007); yet, subsequent analysis of the same data found
that 43 percent took out fewer than 5 loans per year, and that
74 percent took out fewer than 12 (Veritec, 2007). Patterns of
consumer usage, in other words, reveal a standard distribution, with more economically marginal households resorting to
payday loans more often; however, they tend to repay promptly, especially if they anticipate the need for future loans. The
logic of the debt trap has been disputed by economist Thomas
Sowell, who notes that payday loans are short-term loans, and
that computing a three digit APR is analogous “to the price of
salmon as $15,000 a ton or say a hotel room rents for $36,000 a
year, when no consumer buys a ton of salmon and few people
stay in a hotel room all year” (Sowell, 2011, p. 2).
Other economists have put the matter in more pedestrian terms, calculating the implications of using payday loans
to resolve hypothetical expense shocks: One involved $100
needed to avoid a $35 payment penalty for a utility bill.
Assuming the loan was repaid promptly, a payday loan at
$15 per $100 borrowed was $17.39 less costly than the late
payment penalty fee. Another involved a $300 auto repair for a
vehicle needed for work. Compared to the costs of alternative
transportation, the payday loan at $15 per $100 borrowed was
$14.55 less costly (Elliehausen, 2009, pp. 17-18). Significantly,
neither of these scenarios factor in the more dire consequences of a utility shut-off or loss of employment, which would
make the payday loan even less expensive than such draconian outcomes. Opponents of AFS had hoped that the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
under the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, would introduce federal regulations on an industry that
had been the province of the states (Tomasky, 2013). In 2007,
Elizabeth Warren had proposed creating a consumer financial
protection watchdog, similar to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, to regulate AFS. Subprime “financial products are dangerous, and any consumer who is not careful is
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inviting trouble,” she argued, “And yet, dangerous or not, millions of Americans engage in billions of credit transactions,
adding up to trillions of dollars every year.” As conceived by
Warren, this entity,
would be charged with responsibility to establish
guidelines for consumer disclosure, collect and report
data about the uses of different financial products,
review new financial products for safety, and require
modification of dangerous products before they can be
marketed to the public. (Warren, 2007, p. 4)
Subsequent jockeying around CFPB regulations of AFS
have left its opponents disappointed, as lobbyists have convinced lawmakers to exempt their products, such as the carveout of car loans, and obstructed the appointment of a permanent director (Weise, 2013).
Opponents of AFS have been fighting a rear-guard action
insofar as the Financial Service Centers of America (FiSCA)
and Community Financial Services Association of America
(CFSA) have not only been receptive to regulation but also encouraged installment loans as a default for delinquent borrowers. Moreover, mainstream banks and credit unions continue
to offer small dollar loans (SDLs), similar to payday loans, as
well as other financial products for lower income consumers.
While the demand for AFS products is likely to be robust, attempts to regulate them are also likely to continue.

Product Innovations
The AFS market has become more established as a result of
maturation of the industry, technological innovations, and the
incursion of mainstream financial institutions. As noted above,
“best practices” promoted by AFS trade associations include
defaults for delinquent borrowers that convert payday loans to
installment loans. This is not only in the best interests of borrowers, since installment loans extend the time for repayment,
but also lenders, who stand to lose the principal if no payment
is made.
The internet has altered AFS fundamentally by allowing
vendors to evade state regulators. Because they enjoy sovereignty, Tribal Lending Entities (TLEs) have the opportunity
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of competing in a global AFS market. Much of the growth in
payday loans, for example, has been a result of online lending,
which has grown from $5 billion in 2006 to $18.6 billion in 2012
(Hecht, 2013). Tribal sovereignty notwithstanding, the CFPB
will probably attempt to clarify internet lending by TLEs
(Miller, 2013).
The emergence of General Purpose Reloadable (GPR) debit
cards is a growing market for unbanked consumers wanting an
alternative to a conventional checking account. Major vendors
of reloadable debit cards, such as AccountNow, Rush Card,
Emerald, Green Dot, and NetSpend, have found consumers
willing to pay nominal monthly fees for access to ATMs and
card reloading. When cardholders’ employers make direct
payroll deposits and cardholders access cash from ATMs, GPR
cards are less expensive than conventional checking cards.
Moreover, when consumers use GPR cards for bill payment
and their cards report to credit bureaus, GPRs can contribute
to a credit history. The inclusion of savings and loan options
would make GPR cards even more functional for unbanked,
low-income households (Rust, 2013).
Recognizing the expanding AFS market, mainstream financial institutions have offered payday loans and bank
advance loans for account holders (Borne & Smith, 2013).
In March 2013, American Express and Wal-Mart rolled-out
the Bluebird card. Customers from the military, recipients of
Social Security and other government benefits, and taxpayers
expecting refunds will be able to deposit funds directly into
Bluebird Accounts that will be insured by the FDIC. In addition, Bluebird will provide pre-authorized checks and allow
account holders to check balances in real time ("American
Express," 2013). Offered through Wal-Mart, the nation’s largest
retailer, Bluebird promises to reach millions of unbanked and
underbanked customers, providing direct access to low-income households (Morrison, 2013).
The consolidation of the secondary financial services
market continues apace as banks, retailers, and marketers craft
financial products for the working poor. The entry of Wal-Mart
into the arena, which has been long suspected of considering
a bank charter, reflects the viability of the Secondary Financial
Services Market. The entrance of major retailers and mainstream banks into the Secondary Financial Services Market
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through GPR cards may presage expanding GPR card functions to permit bill payment, savings, and possibly SDLs. All of
this will be regulatory fodder for the CFPB (2013); and, while
there is little doubt that regulations will be imposed on AFS,
the likelihood is that any constraints will conform to the requirements of trade associations representing vendors of the
Secondary Financial Services Market.

Reactive Policy Options
The sturm und drang of AFS opponents, directed at
vendors and their trade associations, has not yet produced
corresponding industry corrections as had been hoped via the
CFPB. Regardless, chronic debt by low- and middle-income
households, a prolonged recession, and the entry of mainstream financial institutions into the AFS sector, promise turbulence for the Secondary Financial Services Market, at least
in the near future. In this context, three policy strategies have
evolved with respect to the burgeoning AFS sector: prohibition, regulation, and inclusion.
Prohibition, or its equivalent through interest rate and fee
caps, reflects an impulse that has been evident since the founding of the republic, making unlawful those activities that have
been deemed morally offensive, including alcoholic beverages,
lotteries, and abortion. Making activities for which there is significant demand illegal, however, not only drives them underground where providers tend to offer a product that is inferior,
if not outright dangerous, compared to that available through
legitimate purveyors, but also obligates government to the
costs of oversight, prosecution, and incarceration. Currently,
15 states prohibit payday lending, compared to 28 that permit
such loans (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012).
Regulation of various industries, by contrast, allows them
to operate in the open, affording a measure of surveillance,
permitting government to tax transactions as well as a means
for penalizing noncompliant businesses. Regarding payday
lending, 8 states have established rigorous regulatory schemes
(Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). CFPB may introduce national
regulation of AFS, which has been largely the province of state
regulators.
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Inclusion encourages financial service providers to
make products more available for those who are not in the
economic mainstream, especially workers in the secondary
labor market. Innovative financial products, such as a GPR
card with a savings function, could not only be inclusionary
but also propel the upward mobility of low-income households. In 2006, the FDIC established the Advisory Committee
on Economic Inclusion for this purpose. Primary obstacles of
inclusion are the very structural and psychological factors that
maintain the Secondary Financial Services Market.
While these strategies will consume the attention and resources of those concerned about AFS, a larger issue remains.
The Secondary Financial Services Market, replete with high
interest rates and fees affixed to financial products for low-income, high-risk consumers, provides access to credit that may
stabilize their financial circumstances but at a price that jeopardizes their long-term prosperity.

Proactive Policy Options
Ultimately, the dual financial services market problem will
be resolved in the same way it will be for the dual labor market
problem, by constructing more rungs in the ladder of upward
mobility. Two agendas have evolved around the American
Dream: anti-poverty measures of the New Deal and War on
Poverty located primarily in the federal Department of Health
and Human Services, and a subsequent array of tax expenditures situated in the Treasury Department.
Public welfare consists largely of public assistance and
social insurance that were created by the Social Security Act of
1935 and amplified during the 1960s with the War on Poverty.
The intricacies of these programs are beyond the scope of this
article, but it would be fair to conclude that they are embedded in American social policy due to their popularity, as in
Social Security and Medicare, as well as their essentiality, as in
Supplemental Security Income. The greatest controversy has
been around the means-tested public assistance programs—
the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children),
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and Medicaid—which are targeted for the poor, who are disproportionately minorities.
The eligibility for public assistance programs, dictated
by a means-test on income as well as assets, limits family resources from about $1,000 to $3,000, meaning that minimally
prosperous families, such as those with a dependable automobile needed for work, are ineligible for benefits. TANF’s
“work-first” strategy, through which recipients must take the
first available job, discourages recipients from searching for
optimal employment, and the practice of many states to disallow job training and education consigns many poor households to dead-end jobs. Noncompliant welfare recipients face
benefit sanctions through which assistance is cut or terminated
altogether. The federal five-year time limit and even shorter
state-imposed time limits discontinue benefits for families
transitioning from welfare to work, a poignant problem for
those who need training and education to secure well-paying
jobs and for the poorest families that require long-term support
(Lawinski, 2010; Ridzi, 2009).
A decade after its inception, welfare reform achieved disparate outcomes: many welfare recipients were employed, yet
eligible for other public assistance programs, such as SNAP
and Medicaid; concurrently, the percentage of TANF-eligible
families actually receiving benefits (“take-up rate”) dropped
from 84 percent in 1994 to 42 percent in 2003 (Department of
Health and Human Services, 2007, p. 18). Put another way, in
1996, 68 families received TANF out of every 100 poor households; by 2010, only 27 families out of 100 poor households
benefited from TANF (Trisi & Pavettti, 2012).
Most of those eligible for, but not receiving benefits were
children, of course (Epstein, 2010), underscoring the urgency
of their parents’ need for income. A Faustian bargain had
evolved for low-income American families. Absent adequate
income, workers in the secondary labor market were confronted with suboptimal institutions: public assistance through a
non-responsive welfare apparatus or reliance on high-priced
AFS products.
Tax expenditures were used to benefit low-income workers
through public policy beginning in the 1970s with the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC). As a tax credit, the EITC added to
a lengthy list of benefits by virtue of exclusion from taxation:
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corporate pensions, health insurance coverage, and the interest on mortgages. Significantly, such tax credits enjoyed broad
bi-partisan support, allowing Republicans and Democrats to
show their allegiance to middle-class voters. As a refundable
tax credit, however, the EITC paid a rebate to families whose
income fell below a certain level (Holt, 2006). By the end of the
20th century, tax credits, several of which were also refundable, had been crafted to address specific concerns: the Welfare
to Work Tax Credit, the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, the
Child Tax Credit, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and the
Adoption Tax Credit, among others (House Ways and Means
Committee, 2004). By 2005, 15 states complemented the federal
EITC with state refundable tax credits for low-income families
(Holt, 2006).
Refundable tax credits had several advantages. Foremost,
the volume of revenues was significant: for example, the EITC
benefited 22 million low-income families $41.2 billion in 2006,
and the Child Tax Credit was projected to benefit 35 million
families $52 billion in 2010 (Urban Institute, 2008). Moreover,
tax credits were open-ended. Unlike TANF, which was capped
at $16.5 billion annually, the amount refunded by tax credits
was contingent on the number of eligible tax filers. Tax credits
also avoided the welfare assets test: refunds were apportioned
according to earned income, regardless of the tax filer’s wealth.
In 1986, the EITC was indexed for inflation, thus the value of
refunds increased automatically, a provision that had not been
affixed to AFDC/TANF. Finally, tax credits avoided the stigma
of welfare. Instead of repeated visits to an impersonal welfare
department, tax credits were accessed by filing a W-1040 electronically or by mail. An important indicator of the value of the
tax credit paradigm is the take-up rate, which approximated
75%, far above the 50% typical of public assistance programs.
Thirty years after enactment of the EITC, $205 billion in tax
expenditures have benefited low-income families (Cramer,
Rourke, Cooper, & Luengo-Prado, 2009).
While tax credits have eclipsed TANF in the volume of
benefits for poor families and the strategy has enjoyed bipartisan support, it has demerits. Accessed through the Internal
Revenue Service in the spring, refunds are available at one
time; although they can be spread over the year as a wage supplement, few tax filers take this option. Moreover, beneficiaries
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must participate in the tax system in order to receive refunds;
an unknown, but probably sizable number of the poor prefer
the informal, underground economy to meet their economic
needs. Almost certainly, a large portion of undocumented immigrants remains unbanked for fear of risking deportation.
Limited access to public assistance and the time restriction
of tax expenditures, coupled with the growth of AFS, justify a
new organizational strategy to address poverty: Community
Based Financial Services (CBFS). Such financial services would
offer an array of products, including checking, savings, small
dollar loans, tax preparation, and financial literacy education.
Account holders would have a personal advisor, an account
manager, to help them maximize benefits from various sources
in order to construct a plan to assure their upward mobility.
CBFS organizations would be private, probably nonprofit, although Yunus (2010) has proposed a for-profit, social business
model to address poverty. Significantly, consumers would be
able to choose their CBFS organization, encouraging vendors
to be responsive to service demand. Two candidates for CBFS
have been proposed: Community Credit Unions and financial
services at local post offices.
Following subsidies to establish credit unions in poor
neighborhoods through Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund, Stoesz (2000, 2013) has proposed Community
Credit Unions (CCUs) as a means to provide financial services while building capital in low-income communities. CCUs
would be licensed and regulated by the National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), and provide an array of traditional
products, such as savings and checking, as well as innovative
services, such as micro-finance and Individual Development
Accounts, short-term loans, and tax preparation in order to
maximize tax refunds for workers and employers. Assistance
to consumers would be provided by an account manager who
would not only help members maximize benefits, but also
assist them with other financial objectives related to home
ownership, business development, and higher education/vocational training. Community groups would be allowed to petition local government to provide public assistance through
CCUs, effectively chartering welfare departments. By 2014,
the National Federation of Community Development Credit
Unions boasted 250 members in 46 states serving 2.5 million
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members (National Federation of Community Development
Credit Unions, 2014).
Another alternative would be to provide financial services at local Post Offices (POs), as has been the case in many
European countries. In January 2014, the Inspector General of
the United States Postal Service proposed expanding its financial products to unbanked consumers. This plan would expand
money orders, already sold at POs, to include reloadable debit
cards as well as international remittances. Currently 38 percent
of the nation’s 35,000 POs operate in ZIP codes without a bank,
so this plan would directly fill a vacuum left by mainstream
banks that have abandoned poor neighborhoods. The PO
projects that providing services to just ten percent of the unbanked would divert $8.9 billion to the postal service, a much
needed revenue stream for the beleaguered institution (U.S.
Postal Service Office of the Inspector General, 2014). Senator
Elizabeth Warren, as well as Democratic Congressional leaders,
endorsed the proposal, but it quickly encountered opposition
by Republicans (Becker, 2014). AFS trade associations would
likely oppose the PO proposal.

Staffing Community Based Financial Services
The deployment of an effective network of CBFS providers
rests in large measure with the quality of its staffing. Most AFS
personnel acquire their skills by on-the-job training according to employer priorities and industry “best practice” standards. Credit unions and the Post Office require a high school
diploma for counter services with an undergraduate degree
for supervisory responsibilities. Administrative positions in
financial services are typically reserved for employees with
graduate degrees in business or a related discipline. A handful
of business schools now offer special programs in “social entrepreneurship” that promote economic justice through market
principles (Bornstein & Davis, 2010).
Since the publication of Michael Sherraden’s Assets and
the Poor (1991) and the emergence of a network of organizations advocating asset building, social work has expressed
renewed interest in economic justice. Returning to a field that
it had abandoned for a half-century, social work found other
disciplines had assumed control (Stuart, 2013). Currently three
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schools of social work offer curriculum in financial services:
Arizona State University, the University of Maryland, and
several forming a collaborative in New York City (Birkenmaier,
Kennedy, Kunz, Sander, & Horwitz, 2013), a modest gesture
given the scale of AFS. Bolstering social work’s presence in the
Secondary Financial Services Market would require raising the
visibility of financial capability in professional education.
Within social work, a standardization of the
requirements of certification in financial capability
would facilitate a coordinated approach in social work
education and continuing education efforts. One way to
progress toward standardization is an interprofessional
commission that could study the financial capability
field and research, make recommendations to the
relevant professions about standardization and
certifications, and consider next steps. (Collins &
Birkenmaier, 2013, p. 318)
A late arrival to AFS, social work has much ground to regain
compared to other academic disciplines that educate students
in financial services, such as business, economics, and human
ecology (formerly home economics). Educating students in financial services is problematic if a network of CBFS vendors
has not evolved to employ them. CBFS could be capitalized
through Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), financial instruments
through which government pays investors according to their
achieving predetermined social outcomes. If predetermined
objectives are not met, investors lose their money. New York
Mayor Michael Bloomberg, MDRC, and Goldman Sachs negotiated an SIB to reduce recidivism among older adolescents
sentenced to Riker’s Island. As analysts explained,
In a SIB, investors provide financing to operate federal,
state, or local-run programs that aim to achieve
predetermined outcomes. Generally, these outcomes
are expected to save government money, for example,
by reducing the need for beds in prisons or homeless
shelters. The government entity agrees in advance that,
if the program meets its goals, it will use the savings to
pay back the original investment, plus a return. (Butler,
Bloom & Rudd, 2013, p. 1)
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Goldman Sachs calculated its investment of $9.6 million
would generate positive returns once recidivism dropped at
least ten percent, outcomes determined by the Vera Institute
of Justice (Loeser & Levine, 2012). Given the scale of the
Secondary Financial Services Market, SIBs represent a logical
candidate for financing a network of CBFS.

Conclusion
The Secondary Financial Services Market has expanded
significantly in recent decades, driven by demand for AFS
products. Carrying high fees and interest, AFS are harmful
for many workers in the secondary labor market; however,
in the absence of more constructive options, financially distressed households have little recourse other than resort to the
Secondary Financial Services Market. The access to AFS products has been essential for millions of lower-income workers
not only when routine expenses exceed income, but also when
dealing with emergencies. Reactive policy options are unlikely to provide constructive financial services to lower-income
families, compared to the deployment of Community Based
Financial Services, such as through Community Credit Unions
or Post Offices. Social Impact Bonds are an innovative means
for capitalizing CBFS. Professional training in financial capability could provide lower-income families with services that
would introduce them to an array of financial products designed to accelerate their upward mobility. Along with business, economics, and human ecology, social work could contribute to the professionalization of financial services, given its
historic concern for economic justice.
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